Why do al qaeda attack

It took al-Qaeda two years to organize its first major attack against the United States: the August bombing of U. The United States responded with a quasi-war against al-Qaeda and its state sponsors, which combined a legal indictment of bin Laden with limited military action, including cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in that killed at least six al-Qaeda personnel.

George W. And Bush also grasped the shield, constructing an entire architecture of domestic defense, including the Department of Homeland Security, which was resourced to the tune of tens of billions of dollars every year. The third phase, from , was the invasion of Iraq, where American hopes evaporated in the Mesopotamian sun. Bush had argued that only war could sever the purported—and it turned out largely imagined —alliance between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, and liberate an oppressed people.

The quagmire in Iraq also eroded the parallel mission in Afghanistan. With American attention focused on Iraq, and only limited U. The deployment of U. In Afghanistan, Barack Obama ordered a surge of U. In , U. At the end of the year, American troops left Iraq. There was, finally, a sense of closure. The fifth phase, from , was the era of transformation, as once again, U. The following year, al-Qaeda repudiated its former affiliate.

But far from collapsing as an organization, ISIS subsequently swept into northern Iraq and declared a global caliphate. Meanwhile, in the often-forgotten war in Afghanistan, American troops were withdrawn and the Taliban made steady gains, with the campaign left teetering between stalemate and failure.

Victory would mean achieving core aims at an acceptable cost relative to the benefits. Al-Qaeda did meet some of its goals: With limited resources, bin Laden gained incredible notoriety and inflicted enormous damage on a great power.

But in a broader analysis, bin Laden failed. Yes, U. Crucially, al-Qaeda was unable to mobilize Muslims around a strict Islamist identity that transcended other loyalties. And national, tribal, and other local identities remain profoundly important from the Palestinians to the Pakistanis. From , confidence in bin Laden collapsed in many Muslim-majority countries, falling from 59 percent to 26 percent in Indonesia, and from 56 percent to 13 percent in Jordan.

In a poll taken in 11 Muslim countries, a median of just 13 percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, whereas 57 percent had an unfavorable view.

And now that American military advisers are on the ground in Iraq supporting the Iraqi military, the U. Al Qaeda has long used a mix of strategies to achieve its objectives. In addition, Al Qaeda supports insurgents in the Islamic world to fight against U. The Islamic State embraces some of these goals, but even where there is agreement in principle, its approach is quite different.

Part of this is inspirational: by creating an Islamic state, it electrifies many Muslims who then embrace the group. And part of it is basic strategy: by controlling territory it can build an army, and by using its army it can control more territory. Cole in the port of Aden in , and plots like the attempt to down over 10 transatlantic flights all show an emphasis on the spectacular. At the same time, Al Qaeda has backed an array of lesser terrorist attacks on Western, Jewish, and other enemy targets; trained insurgents; and otherwise tried to build guerrilla armies.

Yet although Al Qaeda has repeatedly called for attacks against Westerners, and especially Americans, it has refrained from killing Westerners when it suited its purposes. Al Qaeda often takes a similar approach to Western aid workers operating in its midst: on at least two occasions, senior leaders of the Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra implored the Islamic State to release Western aid workers the Islamic State had captured and were threatening to execute. The Islamic State evolved out of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and its tactics reflect this context.

Terrorism, in this context, is part of revolutionary war: it is used to undermine morale in the army and police, force a sectarian backlash, or otherwise create dynamics that help conquest on the ground. But it is an adjunct to a more conventional struggle. Al Qaeda, in contrast, favors a more gentle approach. A decade ago Zawahiri chastised the Iraqi jihadists for their brutality, correctly believing this would turn the population against them and alienate the broader Muslim community, and he has raised this issue in the current conflict as well.

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State both profess to lead the jihadist cause throughout the Muslim world. The Islamic State is playing this game too, and wherever there is a call to jihad, there is a rivalry. Although attention is focused on the Islamic State, Al Qaeda affiliates have done well in recent months. The Islamic State has gained support from a number of important jihadist groups. In March, Islamic State supporters in Yemen bombed Houthi mosques, playing on the sectarian war narrative that the Islamic State has long emphasized and Al Qaeda has long sought to suppress—indeed, AQAP immediately issued a statement publicly disavowing any involvement in the mosque bombings.

It is difficult, however, to gauge the overall level of Islamic State support. Al Qaeda has historically been fairly quiet for a terrorist group when it comes to claiming and boasting of attacks, while the Islamic State often exaggerates its own prowess and role to the point of absurdity.

In the past, when an affiliate joined Al Qaeda, it usually took on more regional activities and went after more international targets in its region, but did not focus on attacks in the West.

By taking on the Islamic State label, local groups seem to want to attach themselves to a brand that has caught the attention of jihadists worldwide. Yet this ascendance may be transitory. Like its predecessor organization in Iraq, the Islamic State may also find that its brutality repels more than it attracts, diminishing its luster among potential supporters and making it vulnerable when the people suddenly turn against it.

The good news is that the Islamic State is not targeting the American homeland—at least for now. Its emphasis is on consolidating and expanding its state, and even the many foreign fighters who have flocked to its banner are being used in suicide bombings or other attacks on its immediate enemies, not on plots back in the West.

Western security services are on high alert against the Islamic State threat. The thousands of foreign fighters under its banner are post a risk of greater regional instability at the very least, and U. Many of these individuals will have had little or no contact with the Islamic State as an organization, but they find its ideology and methods appealing and will act on their own.

Ironically, some of these individuals may have preferred to go to Iraq and Syria, but Western disruption efforts make it easier for them to attack at home. The United States and its allies should try to exploit the fight between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda and, ideally, diminish them both. Efforts to stop foreign fighters should stress this infighting. Playing up its atrocities, especially against other Sunni Muslims, will steadily discredit the group.

Military efforts matter tremendously beyond the immediate theater of operations. Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while retaining a messianic commitment to their broader ideological agenda. Although Bin Laden's self-professed goal is to "move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation" 58 until it reaches a revolutionary "ignition point," 59 Al Qaeda leaders' statements and Al Qaeda's attacks largely have failed to effectively mobilize widespread Muslim support for their agenda thus far.

Since late , however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and broader Islamic world indicate that dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy has grown significantly within many Muslim societies. In light of this trend, Al Qaeda leaders' shift toward more explicitly political and ideological rhetoric seems to signal a direct attempt to broaden the movement's appeal, solicit greater financial and material support, and possibly inspire new and more systematically devastating attacks.

Some experts have argued however, that the uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of some public statements by Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri may alienate Muslims who oppose theocracy or who support secular or representative government.

The anti-Shiite sectarian rhetoric of some Al Qaeda affiliates and the persistence of terrorist attacks that kill and maim Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Iraq also undermine Al Qaeda's appeal among some groups. Experience suggests that Al Qaeda's leaders believe that regular attempts to characterize Al Qaeda's actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program.

The identification of limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve broader grievances may generate broader appeal than the group's underlying ideological agenda. Osama Bin Laden's truce proposals addressed to citizens of the United States and its European allies illustrate this trend, but the proposals' validity has been questioned due to ongoing attacks and continuing threats.

Overall, Al Qaeda leaders' statements from the mids through the present indicate that they continue to see themselves and their followers as the vanguard of an international Islamic movement primarily committed to ending U.

Public statements addressed to regional and international populations will likely continue to play a prominent role in Al Qaeda's efforts to achieve its goals.

Recent Al Qaeda messages have been produced by a dedicated studio, known as the Al Sahab. Institute for Media Productions. For example, in Bin Laden's October pre-U. At the time, Bin Laden expressed no solidarity or sympathy for Saddam Hussein or his regime, explaining—"We, as Muslims, do not like the Iraqi regime but we think that the Iraqi people and their children are our brothers and we care about their future.

See Samuel P. The fatwa argued that defensive jihad was necessary "in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip [the U. By electing these leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in all these crimes.

Although portions of the text may reflect revised perspectives and the benefit of hindsight, its key statements of intent correspond to elements of prior statements by Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda figures. It was crowned by the announcement of Bush Jr. Has Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin not informed you that you will not dream of security until we live it in reality in Palestine and before all infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, may peace be upon him?

You however shed rivers of blood in our land so we exploded volcanoes of anger in your land Our message to you is crystal clear: Your salvation will only come in your withdrawal from our land, in stopping the robbing of our oil and resources, and in stopping your support for the corrupt and corrupting leaders.

Bin Laden described the stakes of the confrontation between coalition and jihadist forces in Iraq in the following terms: "The whole world is watching this war and the two adversaries; the Islamic nation, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other. It is either victory and glory or misery and humiliation. The nation today has a very rare opportunity to come out of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it.

Bin Laden: "The one who stays behind and fails to join the Mujahidin when Jihad becomes an individual duty commits a cardinal sin The most pressing duty after faith is repelling the aggressor enemy. This means that the nation should devote its resources, sons, and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its lands. See also the Quran-Al Tawbah, The brothers in the group there should heed his orders and obey him in all that which is good.

Bin Laden urged followers to " These are the most important operations. Bin Laden sanctioned cooperation with Baathists "despite our belief in the infidelity of socialists. The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the Mujahidin, who resists occupation, is considered a renegade and one of the infidels, even if he were an Arab from Rabi'ah or Mudar tribes.

Judging by statements made in the letter, Al Zawahiri largely shared Al Zarqawi's disdain for Shiite Muslims generally and Iraq's Shiite political groups in particular.

He questions the timing of Al Zarqawi's anti-Shiite operations because in his opinion, a majority of the Sunni community Al Qaeda is trying to mobilize on a region-wide basis do not feel as strongly or as negatively about Shi'ism or the Shiite community in Iraq.

And similarly, the brothers in the Islamic State of Iraq must open their hearts to their brothers and listen to them and take what they throw them seriously, and at the same time, they must sincerely advise their brothers about the mistakes or shortcomings they see in them. For example, Bin Laden has linked his opposition to insufficiently Islamic governance in Saudi Arabia to his view that under the Saudi monarchy, "absolute obedience and supremacy are given to the king and his laws, and not to God's religion.

According to Bin Laden, Muslims have a right to participate in the selection of their rulers only under certain "conditions," namely the absence of occupying foreign powers and the presence of candidates willing to rule solely according to Islamic law. Palestine is under occupation and its constitution is man-made and pagan, and Islam has nothing to do with it. Rights cannot be restored from a regime when the ruler becomes renegade or refuses to follow religion except by force.

Al Zawahiri admits that he is "unable Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf for this is their fate. According to Bin Laden, "Islam is one unit that can not be divided Topic Areas About Donate. Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology February 4, — July 9, RL Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mids.

Download PDF. Download EPUB. Topic areas Intelligence and National Security. Summary Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mids. Introduction Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mids using a series of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet postings. Al Qaeda: Statements Founding Principles Osama Bin Laden's experiences as a logistical coordinator and financier for the Afghan and Arab resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the s are thought to have provided the backdrop for his belief that Muslims could take effective military action inspired by select Islamic principles.

Al Qaeda Statements in Outreach and "Truce" Proposals In and , Bin Laden personally addressed the governments and citizens of Europe and the United States directly in an effort to discourage further support for their respective foreign policies in the Islamic world.

Iraq and Al Qaeda's Ideology Strategic Perspectives In December , Bin Laden identified the conflict in Iraq as "a golden and unique opportunity" for jihadists to engage and defeat the United States, and he characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a "Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation. Tactical Differences? Political Goals and Perspectives on Reform The Three Foundations The operations of Al Qaeda affiliates continue to be complemented by centrally-planned ideological outreach activities.

Secular government or "man-made" law is considered unacceptable and deemed contrary to Islamic faith. He criticized hereditary government and identified a need "to specify the power of the sharia based judiciary, and insure that no one can dispose of the people's rights, except in accordance with this judiciary.

Strategic Framework Al Qaeda military commander Sayf al Adl concluded his May text with advice for Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed strategic framework for the jihadist movement.

A summary follows: Jihadist action must have a clear "thought or idea that outlines its means and objectives. The strategic objectives of the jihadist movement should be rooted in and motivated by what Al Adl refers to as "the clear banner of Islam—the banner of 'there is no deity but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.

Detailed strategic and operational plans must be developed with short-term and long-term components. Al Adl links the failures of other "contemporary Islamic movements" to the fact that their "actions were mostly random. In a July statement, Al Zawahiri outlined "a near-term plan and a long-term plan" for achieving Al Qaeda objectives: The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests, as everyone who attacks the Muslim Ummah must pay the price, in our country and theirs, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their interests